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RELEASE OF JOINT TORTFEASORS-VIRGINIA CODE SECTION
8.01-35.1 AND ITS RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment was prompted by the 1979 enactment of Section 8.01-
35.1 of the Code of Virginia,' which changed the law in Virginia regarding
the release of, and contribution among, joint tortfeasors. Contribution
statutes such as section 8.01-35.1 provide an equitable remedy for the
problem of unjust enrichment (or, more accurately, unequal punishment)
whenever one of several joint tortfeasors pays more than his ratable share
of a claim. There has been considerable debate concerning the retroactive
effect of these statutes-that is, whether a newly promulgated contribu-
tion statute can be applied retroactively to affect a claim which arose
before the statute was enacted. The debate focuses on the formulation of
a workable definition of the "right of contribution," and the determina-
tion of when that right arises.
Three cases have recently been decided in Virginia discussing the retro-
active application of Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1.2 The differing opin-
ions and conclusions of the various courts have left the state of the law on
this issue uncertain. This Comment will attempt first to explain the na-
ture of the right of contribution; then to resolve the uncertainties as to
the retroactive application of section 8.01-35.1; and finally to determine
how it should properly be applied in future cases involving release and
contribution among joint tortfeasors in Virginia.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
2. Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Va. 1983); Shiflet v.
Eller, 228 Va. __, 1 V.L.R. 131 (1984); Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp., Law No. 10472,
memorandum op. (Cir. Ct. Prince William County, Va. Jan. 4, 1984). One other case,
Hayman v. Patio Prod., Inc., 226 Va. 482, 311 S.E.2d 752 (1984) was also decided applying §
8.01-35.1 of the Virginia Code. The Hayman case did not directly deal with the issue of the
retroactive application of statute, and so is not central to the scope of this Comment. How-
ever, the Hayman court did discuss the intent of the legislature in passing § 8.01-35.1. The
court considered that intention to be of paramount importance in deciding whether or not
to apply the 1979 statute, or a later amended version, to an accident that occurred in 1977.
The Shifiet court discusses Hayman only briefly, stating that Hayman is distinguishable
because it did not address the retroactivity issue. Shiflet, 228 Va. at _, I V.L.R. at 139.
Although the Hayman case may not have raised the retroactivity issue directly, the court
clearly looked to the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the covenant not
to sue, and decided that it was the governing law in the case. The Shiftet court's attempt to
distinguish the Hayman decision is of questionable validity.
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II. HISTORY OF JOINT TORTFEASOR AND CONTRIBUTION LAW
A. The Release of Joint Tortfeasors
Generally, joint tortfeasors are "liable for the entire damage done."3 At
common law, the release of one tortfeasor operated as a release of all.
4
This is based upon the English rule that the plaintiff could obtain only
one judgment on a joint tort, because the actions of one were considered
to be the actions of all. Thus, there was only one cause of action. When
this cause of action was "reduced to a certainty or merged in the judg-
ment, . . . the judgment against one alone, even though unsatisfied,
barred any later action against another."5 Virginia first recognized this
general common law rule in 18086 and followed it strictly7 until it was
changed in 1979 by Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1.1
In enacting section 8.01-35.1 of the Virginia Code, the General Assem-
bly abrogated the common law rule that the release of one tortfeasor op-
erated as a release of all joint tortfeasors. One year later, this section was
amended9 and the amended version provided that covenants not to sue
and releases may be entered into by one of two or more persons liable in
tort for the same injury or wrongful death without necessarily discharging
the remaining tortfeasors. 10 Thus, under the terms of the statute, a plain-
tiff can now release one joint tortfeasor without releasing others.
Pursuant to a 1982 amendment, subsection D was added, expressly re-
quiring application of section 8.01-35.1 to "all . . .covenants not to sue
executed on or after July 1, 1979 and to all releases executed on or after
July 1, 1980, regardless of the date the causes of action affected thereby
arose."'
11
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 291 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Id. at 301.
5. Day v. Porter, 2 Moody & R. 151, 152, 174 Eng. Rep. 245, 246 (1838) (case dealing with
trespass); see also King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 495, 505, 153 Eng. Rep. 206, 210 (Ex. Ch.
1844) (recovery of debt for goods sold and delivered); Brown v. Wootton, Cro. Jac. 73, 74, 79
Eng. Rep. 62, 63 (K.B. 1600) (recovery in trover).
6. Ruble v. Turner, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 38, 44 (1808).
7. See, e.g., Strickland v. Dunn, 219 Va. 76, 244 S.E.2d 764 (1979); Wright v. Orlowski,
218 Va. 115, 235 S.E.2d 349 (1977); Short v. Hudson Supply & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 306, 60
S.E.2d 900 (1950); First & Merchants Nat'l Bank of Richmond v. Bank of Waverly, 170 Va.
496, 197 S.E. 462 (1938). See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text for a synopsis of VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 and its amendments.
8. 1979 Va. Acts 697 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (1979)). This statute pro-
vided, in part, that when a covenant not to sue was given in good faith to one of two or more
persons liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death, it would not discharge any of
the othez joint tortfeasors unless its terms specifically provided for the release of that other
joint tortfeasor. Id.
9. 1980 Va. Acts 411.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
11. Id. § 8.01-35.1(D). The present text of the statute reads as follows:
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B. Contribution and Release
The fact that one joint tortfeasor was liable for all of the damage done,
regardless of his percentage of fault, led to the emergence of the equitable
doctrine of contribution. 2 This doctrine prevents one joint tortfeasor
from paying more than his share of a particular claim. The Virginia rule
which allows contribution among joint tortfeasors is founded upon En-
glish common law.' Virginia codified this rule in 1919: "Contribution
A. When a release or a covenant not to sue is given in good faith to one of two or
more persons liable in tort for the same injury, or the same property damage or the
same wrongful death:
1. It shall not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury,
property damage or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but any amount
recovered against the other tort-feasors or any one of them shall be reduced by any
amount stipulated by the covenant or the release, or in the amount of the consider-
ation paid for it, whichever is greater. A release or covenant not to sue given pursu-
ant to this section shall not be admitted into evidence in the trial of the matter but
shall be considered by the court in determining the amount for which judgment
shall be entered; and
2. It shall discharge the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability for contri-
bution to any other tort-feasor.
B. A tort-feasor who enters into a release or covenant not to sue with a claimant is
not entitled to recover by way of contribution from another tort-feasor whose liability
for the injury, property damage or wrongful death is not extinguished by the release
or covenant not to sue, nor in respect to any amount paid by the tort-feasor which is
in excess of what was reasonable.
C. A release or covenant not to sue given pursuant to this section shall be subject to
the provisions of §§ 8.01-55 and 8.01-424.
D. This section shall apply to all such covenants not to sue executed on or after July
1, 1979, and to all releases executed on or after July 1, 1980, regardless of the date the
causes of action affected thereby accrued.
12. Glover v. Johns Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894, 900 (E.D. Va. 1979), aff'd in part,
vac'd in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 213 Va.
797, 800, 196 S.E.2d 75, 77-78 (1973); Hudgins v. Jones, 205 Va. 495, 501, 138 S.E.2d 16, 21
(1964).
13. See Hatcher, Battersey's Case (1623): Some Ups and Downs of the Rule There Pro-
nounced, Affecting Contribution Between Joint Wrongdoers, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 123 (1941).
Mr. Hatcher cites English cases from 1622 and 1623 as the earliest he could find concerning
actions between joint wrongdoers. Arundel v. Gardiner, Cro. Jac. 652, 79 Eng. Rep. 563
(K.B. 1622); Battersey's Case, Winch 49, 124 Eng. Rep. 41, sub nom. Fletcher v. Harcot,
Hutton 55, 123 Eng. Rep. 1097 (C.P. 1623). See 47 W. VA. L.Q. at 123. These cases dealt
with joint wrongdoers and the general rule was that between wrongdoers there was neither
indemnity nor contribution. Id. However, Mr. Hatcher notes that the Battersey court found
an exception to that rule when the tortious act itself was "indifferent" and not "unlawful"
or "illegal." The rest of the article stresses that this "exception" has remained the law of
England to the present day, but that a 1799 English case confused the issue by stating that
no contribution whatever could be had between joint tortfeasors. Id. (citing Merryweather v.
Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799)).
The English courts criticized the Merryweather decision and limited it to joint wrongdo-
ers. 47 W. VA. L.Q. at 123 (citing Betts v. Gibbons, Ad. & E. 57, 111 Eng. Rep. 22 (K.B.
1834)). Nonetheless, some early American decisions did adopt the Merryweather rule. 47 W.
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among wrongdoers may be enforced when the wrong is a mere act of neg-
ligence and involves no moral turpitude. 1
4
In 1979, Virginia enacted the statute herein examined, abrogating the
common law rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor operated to re-
lease all.1 5 In addition, the statute provides for the release of the settling
tortfeasor from liability for contribution to the other tortfeasors and vice
versa.
The effect of the current contribution statute on the common law rules
regarding contribution rights after the plaintiff has entered into a cove-
nant not to sue, or a release of a joint tortfeasor, is clear. The issue which
has divided the courts in Virginia, however, is defining the nature of the
"right of contribution." Resolution of this issue will determine the effi-
cacy of applying section 8.01-35.1 retroactively, allowing it to affect claims
which arose before the enactment of the statute.
VA. L.Q. at 125.
Virginia, however, followed the reasoning of Battersey. In Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 22
Va. (1 Rand.) 328, 10 Am. Dec. 538 (1823), Judge Green stated as follows:
[W]hen any burthen ought, from the relation of the parties, or in respect of property
held by them, to be equally borne, and each party is in aequali jure, contribution is
due, unless the claim to contribution has arisen out of some actual fraud, or volun-
tary wrong, in which the party claiming contribution has participated.
Id. at 332, 10 Am. Dec. at 541. Judges Coalter and Brooke used similar reasoning. Id. at 338,
343, 10 Am. Dec. at 545, 549.
It should be noted that in 1909, a solitary Virginia case seemed to change the rule without
citation of any authority. The court in Walton v. Miller, 109 Va. 210, 63 S.E. 458 (1909),
held that the right of contribution did not exist among joint tortfeasors. Mr. Hatcher refers
to the Walton decision and notes that its
holding was repeated in several later Virginia cases [see Palmer v. Showalter, 126 Va.
306, 318, 101 S.E. 136, 140 (1919); Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Hill, 120 Va. 397, 404,
408, 91 S.E. 194, 197 (1917)] until checked in 1919 by the following statute: "Contri-
bution among wrongdoers may be enforced where the wrong is a mere act of negli-
gence and involves no moral turpitude." [VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1950)]. Thus the
statute revived ... the doctrine of Battersey's Case as well as the judicial declara-
tions in Thweat's Adm'r v. Jones, which seemingly had been unchallenged in Virginia
from 1823 to 1909.
47 W. VA. L.Q. at 126.
Further reference to the common law and Virginia statutory law can be found in Brooks
v. Brown, 307 F. Supp. 907, 908 (E.D. Va. 1969); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co.,
202 Va. 527, 530, 118 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1961); Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. v.
Parker, 152 Va. 484, 505, 147 S.E. 461, 467 (1929). The reference in each of these cases to
the fact that there was no contribution at common law can probably be explained by the
confusion created by Merryweather, explained supra.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1950). The current version of this statute, VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984), deleted the words "mere act."
15. Act of March 31, 1979, ch. 697, 1974 Va. Acts 1011 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984)). For a complete text of the statute, see supra notes 8-11 and accom-
panying text.
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In the recent opinion of Shifiet v. Eller,6 the Virginia Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the retroactivity of section 8.01-35.1. The court
ruled that the statute could not be accorded retroactive application. 17
There are some troubling aspects of this decision, however, which make
the supreme court's interpretation of this section questionable. Below is
an analysis of the Shiflet case in light of two earlier decisions, one fed-
eral' 8 and one state circuit court," which applied the same version of sec-
tion 8.01-35.1 but reached opposite results.
III. RECENT CASE LAW INTERPRETING VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 8.01-35.1
A. The Facts of Shifiet v. Eller 0
In October 1977, a collision occurred between a vehicle driven by appel-
lant Mary W. Shiflet, in which appellant Harvey W. Shiflet III was a pas-
senger, and two other motor vehicles. The other vehicles were driven by
Everette F. Horton and appellee Murray L. Eller. The Shiflets filed sepa-
rate damage suits against Horton and Eller in 1979, seeking judgments
for negligence against the defendants jointly and severally.
In May of 1981, the Shiflets settled their claims against defendant Hor-
ton, executing separate documents, both entitled "Release or Covenant
Not to Sue Agreement Pursuant to Virginia Code Section 8.01-35.1, As
Amended." These documents released Horton from further liability to
the Shiflets, but purported to reserve all of the Shiflets' rights and claims
against Eller. The lower court found that the release of Horton also acted
to release Eller, concluding that the accident occurred before enactment
of the statute, and was therefore not affected by it."
The Shiflets appealed the lower court decision to the Virginia Supreme
Court, contending that the lower court's ruling ignored the provisions of
Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1 and the terms of the release document,
which had been drafted in strict compliance with the statute. The Shiflets
argued that the lower court erred when it refused to apply the 1979 stat-
ute to the 1981 release of Horton, even though the Shiflets' cause of ac-
tion for damages arose in 1977."'
16. 228 Va. -, 1 V.L.R. 131 (1984).
17. Id. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 137 (1984).
18. Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Va. 1983).
19. Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp., Law No. 10472, memorandum op. (Cir. Ct. Prince
William County, Va. Jan. 4, 1984).
20. 228 Va. -, 1 V.L.R. 131 (1984).
21. Id. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 132.
22. Id. at -, I V.L.R. at 133.
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B. The Facts of Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc.
In Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc.'2 3 the plaintiff filed suit for an
injury suffered on August 16, 1976, while he was using an allegedly defec-
tive liquid manure pump manufactured by the defendant, Badger-North-
land, Inc. The defendant Badger-Northland impleaded the Patterson
Equipment Co. of Fairfield, Virginia, as a third-party defendant. On May
8, 1982, the plaintiff, in consideration of the sum of $30,000 paid to him
by Patterson Equipment, released Patterson from all liability on any of
plaintiff's claims or causes of action arising out of the accident.
Notwithstanding passage of section 8.01-35.1 and its amendments, the
defendant, Badger-Northland, Inc., proferred a motion for summary judg-
ment, contending that the plaintiff's release of Patterson released Badg-
er-Northland as well. Badger-Northland argued that the law to be applied
to the case was the law that existed on the day of the accident, August 16,
1976; therefore, the date of plaintiff's release of Patterson was not
determinative.2 4
C. The Facts of Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp.
Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp.2 5 addressed very similar issues. The
plaintiff, a committee for Hilda Amidon, sued Potomac Hospital Corp.,
alleging negligence on the part of the hospital, its agents and employees
in rendering medical services to Amidon. The events which gave rise to
this suit occurred on September 16, 1977. Plaintiff filed an amended mo-
tion for judgment on April 27, 1982, naming Potomac, two physicians, the
administrator of the estate of a third physician, and a fourth individual as
defendants. The fourth individual was non-suited on July 14, 1983, and,
in consideration of $475,000, a covenant not to sue was entered into with
the two physicians and the administrator of the third physician's estate.21
As in Carickhoff, Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1 was enacted and
amended after the alleged tort and before the entering of the covenant
not to sue. Availing itself of the same argument used by Badger-North-
land in Carickhoff, Potomac Hospital moved for summary judgment, con-
tending that the law to be applied was the law existing on the day of the
alleged negligence in 1977; thus, the covenent not to sue the three doctors
released Potomac as well."
23. 562 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Va. 1983).
24. Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 160, 162 (W.D. Va. 1983).
25. Law No. 10472, memorandum op. (Cir. Ct. Prince William County, Va. Jan. 4, 1984).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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D. Issues Raised and Addressed
The Carickhoff and Dillon courts attempted to determine the nature of
the "right of contribution." Both courts were concerned with whether it
was a substantive or procedural right. It is at this point that the courts
diverge. Carickhoff found that the right of contribution arises on the date
of the accident, and is a substantive right as of that date.28 Though
Carickhoff used the word "substantive" to describe the right of contribu-
tion, implicit in the court's conclusion was that the right was vested. The
court held that if the statute were applied retroactively, it would deprive
the defendant of a substantive right, thus violating the defendant's guar-
antee of due process of law under the United States Constitution.29 The
Constitution, however, protects only vested interests or contractual
rights.30
The Dillon court did not confuse the terms, and, focusing its determi-
nation upon the inchoate nature of the right to contribution, the court
found the Carickhoff decision to be erroneous.2 1 The Dillon court con-
cluded that the right of contribution did not vest until the actual pay-
ment by a co-defendant.32 Using this premise, the court found no obstacle
barring retroactive application of section 8.01-35.1 because inchoate, pro-
cedural and remedial rights are subject to alteration or destruction at any
time prior to their vesting.2
The Shiflet court reasoned that the right of contribution is a substan-
tive right.34 Unlike Carickhoff, Shiflet makes a distinction between the
terms "vested" and "substantive". 35 Unfortunately, the court did not de-
tect Carickhoffs confusion of the two terms and cites Carickhoff for the
proposition that a retroactive application of the statute would violate the
defendant's due process rights.3"
The definition of the nature of the right of contribution affects whether
or not the Virginia contribution statute can be applied retroactively. The
remainder of this Comment will outline the Virginia rules regarding ret-
roactive application of statutes. The Comment will then attempt to apply
these rules in defining when Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1 should be
applied retroactively.
28. Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 160, 164 (W.D. Va. 1983).
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
31. Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp., Law No. 10472, memorandum op., at 3 (Cir. Ct.
Prince William County, Va. Jan. 4, 1984).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va.. .. 1 V.L.R. 131, 137 (1984).
35. Id. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 135.
36. Id. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 137.
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IV. THE RETROACTIVITY ISSUE-THE VIRGINIA POSITION
Virginia Code section 1-16 states that no new law shall affect "any right
accrued, or claim arising" before the effective date of the new law." The
Code continues, "save only that the proceedings thereafter had shall con-
form, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such pro-
ceedings. ' 3 Interpreting this latter clause, Virginia courts have resolved
that this statute does not bar retroactive application of laws referring
solely to matters of remedy and procedure." The procedural provisions of
a statute in effect on the date of the trial control.40 It has been further
held that this is especially true where the legislature "expressly declares"
that the particular law shall have retroactive application.4'
Section 8.01-1 of the Virginia Code provides that "the applicable law in
effect on the day before the effective date of the particular provisions [of
this title] shall apply if in the opinion of the court any particular provi-
sion (i) may materially change the substantive rights of a party. .. .
The Shiflet court found that Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1 does affect
substantive rights.4 ' Accordingly, the court correctly reasoned that sec-
tion 8.01-1 governed the retroactivity issue, and refused to apply section
8.01-35.1 retroactively.44
It is important to note that subsection D of section 8.01-35.1 was not in
effect when the Shiflets' releases were effectuated45 and therefore could
have no bearing on the case. With the advent of subsection D in 1982,
however, section 8.01-35.1 now expressly declares that it shall have retro-
active effect.46 To this extent, section 8.01-35.1 overrides section 8.01-1 of
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-16 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
38. Id.
39. Virginia & W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 F. Supp. 83 (W.D. Va. 1917), aff'd, 254 F.
379 (4th Cir. 1918); Fletcher v. Tarasidis, 219 Va. 658, 250 S.E.2d 739 (1979); Smith v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978); Hurdle & Foelak v. Prinz & Meihm,
218 Va. 134, 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977); Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974).
40. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. at 476, 248 S.E.2d at 148.
41. Phipps v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 453, 111 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1959). The District Court
for the Western District of Virginia noted in 1982 that the plain language of a procedural
statute applying retroactivity is to be given much weight. Chapman v. Edgerton, 529 F.
Supp. 519, 520 (W.D. Va. 1982). The court observed that "[t]he exemption statute [in Vir-
ginia's Medical Malpractice Act] is purely procedural and by its very wording clearly implies
a legislative intent that it be applied retroactively. The standard of care statute, on the
other hand, contains no language that implies it is to operate retroactively." Id. (emphasis
added).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
43. Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va .. , -, 1 V.L.R. 131, 139 (1984).
44. Id. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 135, 139.
45. The release took place in May, 1981. Id. Subsection D of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1,
which specifically gives the statute retroactive application, was not enacted until 1982. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. "This section shall apply to all such covenants not to sue executed on or after July 1,
[Vol. 18:829
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the Virginia Code.47
In the absence of express language in a statute addressing its retroac-
tive application, such as the clear language of section 8.01-35.1(D), the
Virginia Supreme Court has stated that the question of whether a statute
will be applied retroactively hinges upon the type of rights it affects. If
the statute affects vested rights, it will not be applied retroactively. s In
order to determine the efficacy of applying section 8.01-35.1 retroactively
under this standard, questions concerning the nature and vesting of the
right to contribution must be resolved.
V. SHIFLET AND THE "SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT" ARGUMENT
The Shiflet case involved a release that was effected prior to the enact-
ment of subsection D of Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1. Accordingly, sec-
tion 8.01-1 controlled and the issue was whether the right of contribution
was substantive or procedural. Shiflet found the right of contribution to
be substantive.48 The court concluded that the right became a substantive
right at the time the joint tort occurred.50 Undeniably, the right of contri-
bution is a substantive right. The real issue, however, is at what point
that right exists. In this regard, the Shifiet court's conclusion is
questionable.
The logic behind the "substantive" argument is based upon the pre-
mise that the right to enforce contribution is incidental to the plaintiff's
cause of action against the joint tortfeasors.5' A Wisconsin case which em-
braced the "substantive" view focused upon the existence of the right "in
contemplation of law until it is no longer needed as a resource. '52 At the
same time, the court seems to acknowledge that the right is "contingent,
subordinate or inchoate . . . ,,13 Although Shifiet referred to the lan-
1979, and to all releases executed on or after July 1, 1980, regardless of the date the causes
of action affected thereby accrued." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1984) (em-
phasis added).
47. The Virginia Supreme Court has held that:
[I]f a later statute does not by its terms or by necessary implication repeal entirely a
former one in pari materia, yet it clearly appears that the later statute was intended
to furnish the only rule to govern a particular case, it repeals the former to that
extent. And in deciding that question "the occasion and the reason of the enactment,
the letter of the act, the context, the spirit of the act, the subject matter and the
provisions of the act, have all to be considered."
American Cyanamid Co. v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 831, 841-42 (1948) (citations omitted).
48. Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 416, 46 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1948); see also Stancil v.
United States, 200 F. Supp. 36, 44 (E.D. Va. 1961).
49. Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va.... 1 V.L.R. 131, 137 (1984).
50. Id.
51. DeBrue v. Frank, 213 Wis. 280, -, 251 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1933).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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guage of the Wisconsin case, the Virginia court relied heavily on the most
celebrated of the "substantive" cases, Distefano v. Lamborn,54 which
ruled that the draftsman of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act 55 intended the right to be substantive. Upon examination
of more recent authority, however, the Shifiet court's reliance on Lam-
born seems to be misplaced. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court
severely criticized the Lamborn decision seven years after the case was
originally handed down.5 6 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court, in
Coniaris v. Vail Associates, Inc.,5 7 found the Lamborn reasoning errone-
ous, observing that "[a] claim for contribution is an action separate and
distinct from the underlying tort. The rights and obligations of the
tortfeasors flow, not from the tort, but from the judgment or settlement
itself."5 8
The Coniaris reasoning is in line with the common law rule that each
tortfeasor is liable for the "entire damage done. '59 This rule has led to
well-reasoned opinions concerning contribution in various jurisdictions.6
For example, the Florida Supreme Court, in Village of El Portal v. City
of Miami Shores,"" noted:
The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act does not affect any
vested rights of tortfeasors or create any new obligations in respect to their
tort liability. Since the common tort liability was enforceable against all or
any of the joint offenders at the election of the injured party, section 768.31,
by altering the common law rule of no contribution, does not increase the
liability of any of the participants in the offense. The statute merely lessens
the ultimate liability of each tortfeasor by providing an equitable distribu-
tion of the common burden .... The statute simply changes the form of
54. 46 Del. 195, 81 A.2d 675 (Super. Ct. 1951).
55. For a discussion of the application of the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act, see infra note 89.
56. Halifax Chick Express Inc. v. Young, 50 Del. 596, -, 137 A.2d 743, 744-45 (1958).
The Delaware Superior Court affirmed this view later in Perez v. Shortline, Inc., 231 A.2d
642 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967), ruling that "[t]he discharge of common liability and not the
commission of the tort gives rise to the right of contribution." Id. at 644 (quoting Halifax
Chick Express, Inc. v. Young, 50 Del. at -, 137 A.2d at 744).
Note that the Lamborn court, in reaching its decision, cited the 1924 Virginia case, Nor-
folk & So. R.R. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125 S.E. 678 (1924) (adopting the proposition that
the cause of action for contribution arose at the time of the accident).
57. 196 Colo. 392, 586 P.2d 224 (1978).
58. Coniaris, 196 Colo. at -, 586 P.2d at 225.
59. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 291 (4th ed. 1971).
60. See, e.g., Layne v. United States, 460 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying Alaska law);
Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 196 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978); Village of El
Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Steel, 136
Mich. 588, 99 N.W. 786 (1904); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J.
372, 102 A.2d 587 (1954); Duescher v. Commerano, 256 N.Y. 328, 176 N.E. 412 (1931); Smith
v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960).
61. 362 So.2d 275.
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the remedy without impairing substantial rights.62
The Shiftlet court completely overlooked this common law rule when it
determined that the enactment of section 8.01-35.1 increases the liability
of each joint tortfeasor. The Shifiet court reasoned that the defendant,
Eller, "would be liable ultimately for only one-half of the. . . [plaintiff's]
judgment. '63 The Shiflet court implicitly concludes that an "equitable,
inchoate right . . ." is the same as a substantive right for purposes of
section 8.01-1.64 The number of cases adopting the view that the right of
contribution prior to judgment or settlement is a substantive right is
scant. 5 Presently, only two jurisdictions, Georgia and Tennessee, con-
tinue to adhere to this view after enactment of contribution statutes in
their respective states. A critical analysis of the decisions in these two
states is helpful in analyzing the current Virginia position.
6 6
VI. THE GEORGIA AND TENNESSEE EXCEPTIONS
Georgia and Tennessee have consistently ruled that a release or cove-
nant not to sue statute affects substantive rights and may not be applied
retroactively.
7
62. Id. at 278. The California court in Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873, 14
Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961), echoed the Florida decision, saying:
As of the time of the accident a person did not have a vested right at common law to
avoid paying for the consequences of his negligence merely because there were other
tortfeasors involved. After the entry of a judgment against the joint tortfeasors, each
of them was liable in full until the judgment was satisfied, and, if the plaintiff chose
to collect from one to the exclusion of another, this was a matter of chance rather
than the result of a right which became fixed as of the time of the accident. Contribu-
tion statutes, if applied where an accident antedates their enactment, do not retroac-
tively increase the liability existing at the time of the injury but merely provide a
method by which the liability of each of the tortfeasors may be limited to his pro rata
share of the judgment.
Id. at -, 363 P.2d at 874-75, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43; see also Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. at
-, 161 A.2d at 155.
63. Shifiet, 228 Va. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 138.
64. Id. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 136-37.
65. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575, 196 S.W.2d 919 (1946); F. H.
Ross & Co. v. White, 224 Ga. 324, 161 S.E.2d 857 (1968); Klaas v. Continental So. Lines, 225
Miss. 94, 82 So. 2d 705 (1955); Bargeon v. Seashore Transp. Co., 196 N.C. 776, 147 S.E. 299
(1929); Massey v. Sullivan County, 225 Tenn. 132, 464 S.W.2d 548 (1971).
66. See infra notes 67-98 and accompanying text.
67. For Georgia cases, see Zimmermans, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317, 240
S.E.2d 864 (1977); Smith v. McLendon, 142 Ga. App. 608, 236 S.E.2d 692 (1977). For Ten-
nessee cases, see Miller v. Sohns, 225 Tenn. 158, 464 S.W.2d 824 (1971); Massey v. Sullivan
County, 225 Tenn. 132, 464 S.W.2d 548 (1971).
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A. Georgia
The law in Georgia concerning releases is similar to the law in Virginia
before 1979. It is still the rule in Georgia that the release of one joint
tortfeasor operates to release all joint tortfeasors s.6  However, before the
amendment of the contribution statute in Georgia,6 9 and the enactment
of the covenant not to sue statute in Virginia7 0 the contribution and set-
tlement laws of the two states differed greatly.7 '
In Georgia, prior to 1972, settlement by one tortfeasor did not give rise
to the right of contribution from other joint tortfeasors. 72 Under the old
law, "[biefore a claim . . . can arise under [Georgia] Code Ann. § 105-
2012 it must appear that a judgment. . . has been entered . . . against
the tortfeasor who claims contribution because of the payment made. '7 3
In Virginia, prior to 1979, the right to contribution could be enforced
when a compromise settlement, rather than a judgment, had been
reached."4 The tortfeasor against whom contribution was sought had only
the right to challenge on the grounds that the compromise settlement was
"unreasonable, excessive, made in bad faith, or that he was not concur-
rently negligent, or that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the
68. Zimmermans, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317, 240 S.E.2d 864 (1977);
Smith v. McLendon, 142 Ga. App. 608, 236 S.E.2d 692 (1977).
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Prior to 1972, the statute read: "(1)
Where the tortious act does not involve moral turpitude, contribution among several tres-
passers may be enforced just as if they had been jointly sued. (2) If judgment is entered
jointly against several trespassers, and is paid off by one, the others shall be liable to him
for contribution." Id. Since 1972, the statute has read as follows:
(a) Where a tortious act does not involve moral turpitude, contribution among several
trespassers may be enforced just as if an action had been brought against them
jointly. Without the necessity of being charged by action or judgment, the right of a
joint trespasser to contribution from another or other shall continue unabated and
shall not be lost or prejudiced by compromise and settlement of a claim or claims for
injury to person or property or for wrongful death and release therefrom.(b) If judg-
ment is entered jointly against several trespassers and is paid off by one of them, the
others shall be liable to him for contribution.(c) Without the necessity of being
charged by an action or judgment, the right of indemnity, express or implied, from
another or others shall continue unabated and shall not be lost or prejudiced by com-
promise and settlement of a claim or claims for injury to person or property or for
wrongful death and release therefrom.
Id. § 51-12-32 (1982).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
71. Compare Hangar Cab Co. v. City of Atlanta, 122 Ga. App. 661, 178 S.E.2d 292 (1970)
with Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961).
72. Hangar Cab, 122 Ga. App. at -, 178 S.E.2d at 293.
73. Id. at -, 178 S.E.2d at 293-94 (citations omitted).
74. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 531, 118 S.E.2d 646, 648
(1970). This line of reasoning was premised on the notion that the right of contribution
arises "when" payment is made by one tortfeasor. Id. at 532, 118 S.E.2d at 649.
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injuries compromised . .. -."
In 1972, Georgia amended its contribution statute to state that
"[w]ithout the necessity of being charged by suit or judgment, the right of
contribution from another or others shall continue unabated and shall not
be lost or prejudiced by compromise or settlement . . . . 7" Subsequent
Georgia cases applying this statute quote a pre-amendment case77 to find
that the right of contribution is a substantive right, fixed at the time of
injury, so that the law in effect at the time of settlement has no bearing
on the case.
7
1
B. Tennessee"9
Before the present Tennessee covenant not to sue statute became effec-
tive, Tennessee law provided that a covenant not to sue released only the
covenanting party, and that no amount received was credited to the judg-
ment against the other joint tortfeasor80 In effect, a plaintiff could still
recover the full amount against the non-settling tortfeasor.81 In 1979 Ten-
nessee adopted the 1955 Uniform Act, which allowed consideration paid
for the release to be credited to a later judgment."2 The enactment of this
statute provided a policy of contribution where none had previously
existed.
C. Differences in Virginia
In Virginia, before enactment of its covenant not to sue statute, an in-
jured party could not release a tortfeasor without releasing all
tortfeasors5 3 The 1979 statute provided that unless the express terms of
the agreement stipulated otherwise, a covenant not to sue would release
only the settling tortfeasor.8 4 The remaining liability of the non-settling
tortfeasor would be credited with the consideration received for the cove-
75. Id. at 531, 118 S.E.2d at 648 (citation omitted).
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
77. F. H. Ross & Co. v. White, 224 Ga. 324, 161 S.E.2d 857 (1968).
78. See Enger v. Erwin, 245 Ga. 753, 754, 267 S.E.2d 25, 26 (1980); Southern Ry. v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 134 Ga. App. 219, -, 213 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1975).
79. For a good review of the distinction between the development of Tennessee and Vir-
ginia law concerning the right to contribution as a substantive or procedural right, see Com-
ment, The Covenant Not to Sue: Virginia's Effort to Bury The Common Law Rule the
Regarding the Release of Joint Tortfeasors, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 809, 830-31 (1980).
80. Id. at 830.
81. Id.
82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3105 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-11-105 (Repl. Vol. 1980)).
83. See supra notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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nant not to sue.5 The court in Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp. 6 noted
that the statute does not disturb the right of contribution, it merely pro-
vides for a "more streamlined method of computing contribution."87
Before the enactment of the statute, a tortfeasor was required to pay the
plaintiff, then seek contribution from fellow tortfeasors. Now, "§ 8.01-35.1
simply allows the amount of the judgment to be reduced by what the
plaintiff has already received as compensation."8 In this respect, the "eq-
uitable policy" of contribution is upheld by the statute.
In addition to preserving the "policy" behind contribution, section
8.01-35.1 greatly encourages settlement. 9 Public policy in Virginia also
favors settlement.90 Though the reduction of later monetary judgments
against non-settling tortfeasors promotes settlement, there is still some
argument as to whether the reduction should be made on a pro tanto or
pro rata basis.91 Most jurisdictions have made the reduction on a pro
85. Id. § 8.01-35.1(A)(1).
86. No. 10472, memorandum op. (Cir. Ct. Prince William County, Va. Jan. 4, 1984).
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1(A)(1) & (2) echoes § 4 of the 1955 Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act. By preventing a non-settling tortfeasor from receiving any contri-
bution from a settling tortfeasor, such sections have been credited with greatly encouraging
settlements. The Commissioner's Comment to § 4 of the 1955 Uniform Act demonstrates
that this is a primary goal of § 4, and one of the main reasons for its replacement of § 5 of
the 1939 Uniform Act. The Comment observes that § 5 of the 1939 Act discouraged rather
than promoted settlements by providing:
[T]hat a release of any tortfeasor should not release him from liability for contribu-
tion unless it expressly provided for a reduction "to the extent of the pro rata share
of the released tortfeasor" of the injured person's recoverable damages. This provi-
sion has been one of the chief causes for complaint where the Act has been adopted,
and one of the main objections to its adoption.
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4, Commissioner's Comment, 12 U.L.A.
98-99 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 UNIFORM AcT].
Moreover, the Commissioner's Comments observe that § 5 of the 1939 Uniform Act dis-
couraged settlements for two reasons. First:
Plaintiff's attorneys . . . refuse to accept any release which contains the provision
reducing the damages "to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor,"
because they have no way of knowing what they are giving up. The "pro rata share"
cannot be determined in advance of judgment against the other tortfeasors ....
[Furthermore], [n]o defendant wants to settle when he remains open to contribution
in an uncertain amount, to be determined on the basis of a judgment against another
in a suit to which he will not be a party.
Id.
90. Crandell v. United States, 703 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1983); 4A MIcHIE'S JUR. Compro-
mise & Settlement § 4 (Supp. 1984).
91. The 1955 Uniform Act remarks that the idea underlying the pro rata reduction provi-
sion in the 1939 Uniform Act was that a pro tanto reduction would provide too much oppor-
tunity for collusive settlements. 1955 UNIFORM AcT, supra note 89, at 99. This fear was
expressed in the dissenting opinion to Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129
(1964): "[If] the injured party is required to credit only the amount received in settlement
... he may be tempted to make collusive settlements." Id. at - , 208 A.2d at 137 (Fran-
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tanto basis. 92 Only those jurisdictions adopting the 1939 Uniform Act
have opted for a pro rata reduction.
9 3
The basis of the "pro tanto versus pro rata" debate lies in the fact that
contribution is an equitable remedy. Allowing a credit to be made against
a later judgment reflects this equitable policy. The Virginia statute94 and
the 1955 Uniform Act allow a pro tanto reduction. In so doing, they both
provide a non-settling tortfeasor with a type of quid pro quo by reducing
the total amount of liability in exchange for taking away the right to sue
for contribution.
In Carr v. United States95 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that it is not necessary that some new benefit be created as a quid pro
quo when the legislature abolishes a previously held right.96 Nonetheless,
ces, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 92, 110
A.2d 24, 36 (1954)).
The Commissioner's Comments in the 1955 Uniform Act note, however, that "[r]eports
from the state [sic] where the [1939] Act is adopted appear to agree that it has accom-
plished nothing in preventing collusion." 1955 UNIFORM AcT, supra note 89, at 99.
92. See, e.g., McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1022, 147 Cal. Rptr.
694, 704 (1978); Sobotta v. Vogel, 37 Mich. App. 59, -, 194 N.W.2d 564, 566 (1971);
Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, -, 175 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1970); Levi v. Montgomery,
120 N.W.2d 383, 389 (N.D. 1963).
93. See, e.g., Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, __ , 161 A.2d 150, 155 (1960). The most
prolific arguments concerning pro tanto versus pro rata reduction can be found in the New
Jersey decisions, Tino v. Stout, 90 N.J. Super. 395, 217 A.2d 885 (1966) and Theobald v.
Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129. The majority in 'ino gave the following statement:
There is a strong policy in favor of settlement. A contribution law should provide the
maximum room for settlements with a minimum of unfairness. An uninsured and
impecunious tortfeasor would rarely settle for less than his pro rata share of the judg-
ment unless he knew he was protected from claims by joint tortfeasors as to subse-
quent payments by the latter.
Tino , 90 N.J. Super. at -, 217 A.2d at 886.
The dissenting opinion in Tino, advocating a pro tanto reduction, remarked that "to hold
that the liability of a defendant who has paid his pro rata share of a judgment is automati-
cally discharged by acceptance of less than a pro rata share from a co-defendant will inevi-
tably discourage settlements and keep much litigation alive which would otherwise be termi-
nated." Id. at -, 217 A.2d at 887 (Labrecque, J., dissenting).
This argument is not very persuasive as is noted in the 1955 UNIFORM AcT, supra note 89,
at 99. The Commissioners of the Uniform Act are not alone. One commentator, refuting the
reasoning in the Tino dissent, observed:
A plaintiff is willing to settle because he is allowed to receive as complete a satisfac-
tion as before. He receives the settlement figure plus any amount awarded against the
nonsettling tortfeasor. It also encourages the covenantee or releasee to settle so as to
totally extinguish his liability. Additionally the largest burden falls on the party who
was [not] willing to settle.
Comment, supra note 79, at 825.
94. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
95. 422 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1970).
96. Id. at 1010 (citing Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929)). Carr involved an alleged
unconstitutional abrogation of a government employee's common law right of action against
a fellow employee. The court held that the statute at issue was an adequate quid pro quo
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the court seemed to support the quid pro quo theory, justifying the legis-
lative action in dicta by stating that Congress had "provided an adequate
quid pro quo for the common law cause of action it had abolished. '97 The
court in Dillon v. Potomac Hospital Corp. apparently adopted this latter
reasoning. The court observed that "[w]hile . . . [reduction] may alter
the proportional share each tortfeasor will ultimately contribute, it has
been held that statutes which merely alter the potential amount of recov-
ery are not unconstitutional."98
VII. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
A. Cause of Action versus Right of Action: Carickhoff's First Mistake
An early Virginia case, Norfolk & Southern Railroad v. Beskin, 9 es-
pouses the view that the right of contribution exists from the time the
tort occurs.' This line of reasoning was adopted by the Carickhoff court,
although no reference is made to Beskin.'0 ' The Carickhoff court followed
the proposition, propounded in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Minnifield,0 2 that a distinction should be made between the right to con-
tribution and the right to institute a suit to compel contribution.10 3
The Carickhoff court utilized the Minnifield distinction, yet disre-
garded the holding of the Minnifield court that the right to contribution
arose only upon payment by one tortfeasor 0 4 A recent Virginia Supreme
Court case ameliorates the confusion evidenced by the Carickhoff court.
since it provided protection against liability which appellant might otherwise incur.
97. Id. at 1010-11.
98. Dillon, memorandum op. at 4 (citing Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 705 F.2d
164, 172 (6th Cir. 1983)).
99. 140 Va. 744, 125 S.E. 678 (1924).
100. Id. at 747, 125 S.E. at 679.
101. Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 160, 165 (W.D. Va. 1983).
102. 213 Va. 797, 196 S.E.2d 75 (1973).
103. The Minnifield court stated "[m]oreover, there is a valid distinction between the
accrual of the equitable, inchoate right to contribution that arises at the time of jointly
negligent acts and the maturation of the right to recover contribution that arises only after
payment of an unequally large share of the common obligation." Id. at 799, 196 S.E.2d at 77
(citing Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 445, 34 N.W.2d 790, 793 (1948)). The Delaware
Superior Court in Distefano v. Lamborn, 46 Del. 195, 81 A.2d 675 (Super. Ct. 1951), found
that the draftsmen of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 stated that
the right of contribution is substantive. "The first subsection of the second section creates a
right of contribution as a matter of substantive law amongst those who are jointly liable for
injuries to the person or property of another." Id. at -, 81 A.2d at 678 (quoting Gregory,
Discussion of Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 16 A.L.I. PROc. 348 (1939)). The court
went on to state: "We must distinguish between the right to contribution and the right to
institute suit to compel contribution." Id. at -, 81 A.2d at 679 (citing DeBrue v. Frank,
213 Wis. 280, 251 N.W. 494 (1933)).
104. Carickhoff, 562 F. Supp. at 163 (quoting Minnifield, 213 Va. at 798, 196 S.B.2d at
76).
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This case, First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker,0 5 distinguishes be-
tween a "cause of action" and a "right of action": "A right of action is the
right to presently enforce a cause of action-a remedial right affording
redress for the infringement of a legal right belonging to some definite
person; a cause of action is the operative facts which give rise to such
right of action.'
10 6
Although the Shiflet court equates the equitable, inchoate right of con-
tribution with a cause of action and a substantive right,10 7 it does ac-
knowledge that there is a distinction between a cause of action and a
right of action. 0 8 Since section 8.01-35.1(D) was not in effect when the
release in Shifiet was entered into, the court's sole focus was on the sub-
stantive versus procedural issue.1"' The release in Carickhoff, however,
was entered into after section 8.01-35.1(D) became effective." 0 Accord-
ingly, the Carickhoff court's focus should properly be on whether the
right of contribution had accrued prior to enactment of section 8.01-
35.1(D).
The logic of the Carickhoff decision rests upon the premise that Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-35.1 eliminates the cause of action of contribu-
tion. The court concluded that retroactive application of the statute
would violate a right which accrued at the time of the accident. The very
language found in the decision, however, tends to demonstrate the fallacy
of this premise. The court determined "that a retroactive application of
Va. Code 8.01-35.1 would entirely take away [the defendant's] right to
sue . ..for contribution."'" It follows that, by taking away the right to
sue, the statute merely removes the right to presently enforce a cause of
action, not the cause of action itself.
The Carickhoff court further confuses the important distinction be-
tween a right of action and a cause of action when it quotes an earlier
case, stating that "it found no logic in the Virginia cases [which] hold
that no cause of action for contribution exists prior to payment."' 2 The
Virginia case to which the Carickhoff court referred, Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Jewel Tea Co.," 3 involved a right of action, not a cause
of action. Jewel Tea does not state that the cause of action does not exist
105. 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 (1983).
106. Id. at 81, 301 S.E.2d at 13.
107. Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. -, _1 V.L.R. 131, 136-37 (1984).
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
110. The release in Carickhoff was entered into on May 8, 1982. Carickhoff, 562 F. Supp.
at 162. Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1(D) became effective on April 1, 1982. 1982 Va. Acts.
196.
111. Carickhoff, 562 F. Supp. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 163-64 (quoting Rambone v. Critzer, 548 F. Supp. 660, 662 n.1 (W.D. Va.
1982)).
113. 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961).
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prior to payment; rather it states that "[t]he right of action arises upon
payment or discharge of the obligation."
1 14
Finally, the Carickhoff court, in attempting to determine when a
party's right to contribution arises, notes that "Virginia case law . . .
[provides] no unambiguous or unequivocal answer."' 15 A careful review of
the Virginia cases, however, reveals that there are at least seven cases
decided by the Virginia Supreme Court,l"" and at least three cases de-
cided by the federal district courts applying Virginia law," 7 which hold or
imply that the right to contribution does not arise until payment by one
joint tortfeasor has been made. Only one Virginia decision holds to the
contrary."l 8
B. The Due Process Argument: Carickhoff's Second Mistake-Shiflet's
Blind Adoption
The Shiflet court, in dicta, cites Carickhoff for the proposition that the
retroactive application of a statute that affects a "substantive" right
would violate the defendant's "due process" rights."19 Generally, however,
the due process rights that may not be affected by retroactive legislation
are contractual rights and vested interests."0 The Shifiet court goes to
great lengths to distinguish substantive rights from vested rights, arguing
that substantive rights "are included within that part of the law dealing
with the creation of duties, rights, and obligations, as opposed to proce-
114. Id. at 532, 118 S.E.2d at 649. In Rambone v. Critzer, 548 F. Supp. 660, the court
attempts to explain its "no logic" finding with the following statement:
If no cause of action for contribution exists prior to payment then, if payment is not
made ... until after the applicable statute of limitations has run ... on any claim
the plaintiff may have against the third party defendant, then the defendant will
never have a right to contribution from a joint tort-feasor.
Id. at 662 n.1. A more careful reading of Jewel Tea reveals that the court stated, "It]he
right of action arises upon payment or discharge of the obligation, and it is then that the
statute of limitations begins to run." Jewel Tea, 202 Va. at 532, 118 S.E.2d at 649.
115. Carickhoff, 562 F. Supp. at 163.
116. Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 196 S.E.2d 75; Bartlett v. Roberts Recapping, Inc., 207 Va.
789, 153 S.E.2d 193 (1967); Jewel Tea, 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646; Van Winckel v. Carter,
198 Va. 550, 95 S.E.2d 148 (1956); Wiley N. Jackson Co. v. City of Norfolk, 197 Va. 62, 87
S.E.2d 781 (1955) (contribution in contracts action); McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co.,
190 Va. 851, 59 S.E.2d 121 (1950); Houston v. Bain, 170 Va. 378, 196 S.E. 657 (1938); see
also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
117. Laws v. Spain, 312 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Va. 1970); Brooks v. Brown, 307 F. Supp. 907
(E.D. Va. 1969); North River Ins. Co. v. Davis, 274 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Va. 1967); see also
infra note 125 and accompanying text.
118. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125 S.E. 678.
119. Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. -, -, 1 V.L.R. 131, 137 (1984) (citing Carickhoff v.
Badger-Northland, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 160, 164 (W.D. Va. 1983) and Duffy v. Hartsock, 187
Va. 406, 416, 46 S.E.2d 570, 575 (1948)).
120. Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. at 417, 46 S.E. at 574-75.
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dural or remedial law. .. .""I' This reasoning may be sound, but both
Shifiet and Carickhoff make a significant error when they cite Duffy v.
Hartsock"' for the proposition that due process rights would be affected
by retroactive application of section 8.01-35.1. The Duffy court addressed
the due process issue raised when there is impairment of contractual
rights and vested interests, not substantive rights. 123 Both Carickhoff and
Shifiet borrow the Duffy reasoning but freely substitute the words "sub-
stantive right" for "vested rights."
In a very real sense, the consitutional issue of whether or not section
8.01-35.1 can be applied retroactively hinges upon a determination of
whether or not the "right" of contribution is vested or inchoate. As noted
earlier in this article, the Shiflet court correctly did not discuss this issue
because of the governing Virginia statute at the time.1 4
The Carickhoff decision cannot be allowed to escape scrutiny on this
point. The Carickhoff court argued that the right to sue for contribution
arises at the time of the accident and is substantive. But if the right of
action is considered the "right to presently enforce a cause of action,"' 25
there can be no right of action for contribution until payment by one
121. Shiflet, 228 at __, 1 V.L.R. at 135 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed.
1979)). The court follows with a quotation from Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or. 545, 550, 495
P.2d 273, 276 (1972), stating that "[w]hile all vested rights may be considered substantive
... it does not necessarily follow that the only subject matter that is considered to be
substantive is that which relates to vested rights." Shiflet, 228 Va. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 135.
122. 187 Va. 406, 46 S.E.2d 570 (1948). Duffy is cited by both the Shiflet court, Shifet,
228 Va. at -, 1 V.L.R. at 137, and the Carickhoff court, Carickhoff, 562 F. Supp. at 164.
123. Duffy, 187 Va. at 416, 46 S.E.2d at 575.
124. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
125. First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 81, 301 S.E.2d 8, 13 (1983); see
also Lowe v. Spain, 312 F. Supp. 315, 318 (E.D. Va. 1970) ("The right to contribution arises
when one joint tort-feasor has paid a claim for which the other joint tortfeasor is liable.");
Brooks v. Brown, 307 F. Supp. 907, 909-10 (E.D. Va. 1969) (right is substantive "when, and
only when, one tortfeasor has paid a claim for which they both are liable" (cite omitted));
North River Ins. Co. v. Davis, 274 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Va. 1967) ("[R]ight of contribu-
tion arises only when one of the joint tortfeasors has paid a claim for which the other wrong-
doer is also liable."), aff'd, 392 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1968); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 798, 196 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1973) ("[R]ight of contribution arises only
when one tortfeasor has paid or settled a claim for which other wrongdoers are also liable.");
Bartlett v. Roberts Recapping, Inc., 207 Va. 789, 793, 153 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1967) ("right
arises only when one tortfeasor has paid or settled a claim for which other wrongdoers are
also liable"); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 532, 118 S.E.2d 646,
649 (1961) (Contribution "is a right that is given by statute and arises when, and only when,
one tortfeasor has paid a claim for which they both are liable."); Van Winckel v. Carter, 198
Va. 550, 556, 95 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1956) ("The right to contribution becomes complete and
enforceable upon the payment or discharge of the common obligation."); McKay v. Citizens
Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 857, 95 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1950) (indemnitor's cause of action
does not arise until payment made to the injured party); Houston v. Bain, 170 Va. 378, 390,
196 S.E. 657, 662 (1938) ("to enforce contribution the payment must have been made by one
obligated to pay the whole").
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tortfeasor. The Carickhoff court's decision is based upon the premise that
the right to sue for contribution is comparable to a vested property right
or contractual right.12 The right of action for contribution, however,
could more accurately be compared to rights like dower and curtesy. Cer-
tainly, the rights of dower and curtesy arise upon marriage but are not
vested until the death of one of the spouses."" The United States Su-
preme Court, in Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank,"28 held
that, under Florida law, an ex parte divorce could cut off the inchoate
dower rights without violating a wife's due process rights. 129 Similarly, the
Virginia Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he General Assembly may al-
ter or abolish the contingent right of dower without doing violence to ei-
ther the State or Federal Constitutions because it is not a vested
right."130
In 1979, the Attorney General of Virginia addressed the issue of
whether the right of contribution is a vested right."'1 The Attorney Gen-
eral saw no objection to the retroactive application of section 8.01-35.1
because, in his opinion, the right did not vest until payment was made."'1
The opinion referred to Virginia Code section 1-16"'1 and Hurdle & Foe-
lack v. Prinz & Meihml" and advised that a statute, such as section 8.01-
35.1, which restricted "the remedy by which a claim could be pursued was
not equivalent to affecting the claims themselves .
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the recent decision in Shifiet, additional cases concerning the in-
terpretation of Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1 and its retroactive applica-
126. Carickhoff, 562 F. Supp. at 164-65.
127. Wilson v. Wilson, 195 Va. 1060, 81 S.E.2d 605 (1954). The Wilson court stated that
"the wife's right of dower is merely inchoate; it is a contingent possibility and not a vested
right." Id. See also Turner v. Turner, 185 Va. 505, 39 S.E.2d 299 (1946), where the court
gave the following explanation:
It cannot be doubted that an inchoate or contingent right of dower is a valid right or
interest .... But it emanates from and is solely dependent upon the beneficial own-
ership of the husband. The right of dower is consummated and raised to the dignity
of an estate in land by the death of the husband. Before then and while coverture
continues, the wife's right of dower is merely inchoate; it is a contingent possibility
and not a vested right . . . .She has neither an estate nor a right of action ....
Turner, 185 Va. at 510, 39 S.E.2d at 302 (citations omitted).
128. 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
129. Id. at 85-86.
130. Turner, 185 Va. at 511, 39 S.E.2d at 302.
131. 1978-79 Op. Att'y Gen. 247 (1979).
132. Id.
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-16 (Repl. Vol. 1979). For a more complete discussion of this sec-
tion, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
134. 218 Va. 134, 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977).
135. 1978-79 Op. Att'y Gen. at 249.
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tion are ripe for adjudication by the Virginia Supreme Court. 136 The court
has determined that this section does not apply to releases and covenants
not to sue entered into prior to enactment of subsection D. In cases such
as Dillon where a release or covenant not to sue is entered into after 1982,
the Virginia Supreme Court should look with disfavor upon the decision
in Carickhoff v. Badger-Northland, Inc.13 7 and instead follow its own rea-
soning in First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker."38 The debate over the
legal distinction between the right of contribution and the cause of action
for contribution provides an opportunity for application of the First Vir-
ginia Bank-Colonial rule. It should be determined that Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-35.1(D) does not extinguish the cause of action of contribution
any more than a statute of limitations extinguishes a cause of action.13 It
merely extinguishes the right to enforce the cause of action for contribu-
tion as of the date of release of settlement. Consistent with the applica-
tion of section 8.01-35.1, as amended, covenants not to sue and releases
entered into by one joint tortfeasor after enactment of subsection D
should not operate to release all joint tortfeasors.
Gary R. Allen
0
136. The Virginia Supreme Court has recently heard a case involving this statute. How-
ever, the decision did not concern the retroactive portion of § 8.01-35.1. See Hayman v.
Patio Prod., Inc., 226 Va. 482, 311 S.E.2d 752 (1984).
137. 562 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Va. 1983).
138. 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8 (1983). See also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
139. IV. BRYSON, HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 163-64 (1983). The author
notes that "the right or obligation [in a contract action] is not taken away by the statute [of
limitations]; only the remedy is barred." Id. at 164.
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